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THE BUSH FOREIGN POLICY 2001-2003: 
UNILATERALIST THEORY IN A MULTILATERAL 
WORLD, AND THE OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE 
OFFERED BY IRAQ 
MICHAEL J. KELLY∗ 
It should come as no surprise that George W. Bush arrived in 
Washington in 2001 with the unilateralist approach to politics that got him 
twice elected governor of Texas, secured the Republican nomination, and 
paved his path to the White House. Thus, from his point of view, there was 
no good reason to abandon it upon moving into the Oval Office. No matter 
that it delighted only his political base and alienated everyone else, inside 
and outside the G.O.P. 
It should also come as no surprise, therefore, that this political attitude 
lapped over into the foreign policy arena as a natural outgrowth of 
President Bush’s basic philosophy. Such a simplistic, straightforward 
approach is certainly attractive, and easily sold to like-minded 
conservatives on whom the President relies heavily for political support; 
but it is unpersuasive in the arena of foreign relations and ineffective in the 
conduct of long-term foreign policy.  
I. UNDERLYING THEMES 
Two general themes, derived largely from his own persona, defined the 
foreign policy of Mr. Bush in the first half of his presidency: an 
unswerving insistence on viewing the world in terms of black and white, 
and a predisposition to “go it alone.” These dual themes have not only 
informed the individual foreign policy decisions undertaken by his 
administration, for which much international criticism has been drawn, but 
have also guided America steadily into a position of disdain from the 
global community. 
President Bush’s self assurance in the rightness of his own decisions 
has translated into a take-it-or-leave-it approach to world affairs that 
frustrates America’s allies and manages to achieve only short-term 
political/economic results at the expense of viable long-term solutions. 
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Moreover, the constant management of foreign relations from the White 
House political staff and the Pentagon without State Department 
consultation has effectively stripped away Secretary Powell’s ability to 
wrap foreign policy decisions in diplomatic parlance.  
Thus, when a decision to withdraw from a treaty or to undertake 
military action is made, it is usually a surprise—presented in its rawest 
form for other governments to learn about on CNN or read in the Herald-
Tribune. Multilateral consultation, careful diplomatic negotiation, constant 
follow-up by telephone, and exchange of notes (even if only for window-
dressing) were hallmarks of his father’s approach to world affairs. Such 
traditional approaches have been utterly discarded by G.W. Bush. 
Consequently, the themes that underly the approach of G.W. Bush 
ironically work to undermine his foreign policy as soon as it emerges. 
A. The Monochromatic Perspective 
The Clinton administration was heavily criticized for viewing the 
world in terms of moral relativism. The shades of grey that existed 
between dictatorships and democracies could be justifiably ignored in 
pursuit of larger aims like expanding the global economy and opening new 
markets; thereby laying the groundwork for greater political freedoms in 
the future. However, the aperture setting of the G.W. Bush administration 
filters out the grey, converting the political landscape of the world into 
highly contrasting extremes of black and white. Thus, while the previous 
president could be chastised for reliance on moral relativism, the current 
president can be equally recriminated for moral absolutism. 
This predisposition to categorize states as supportive or unsupportive 
of America immediately divides the world into “us versus them” camps; 
the countries that fall into those camps change with the issue. Perhaps 
most damaging to this administration’s ability to craft and carry out an 
effective foreign policy is its insistence on drawing up these categories 
before attempting to negotiate with states to switch sides, and then leaking 
where those states fall (on the right side or the wrong side). The 
supposition that states will switch on their own once they find out where 
they stand in order to remain on good terms with the United States belies 
the arrogance and amateurish approach to foreign affairs endemic in this 
White House. 
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It is this underlying theme that resonated in the well of the House of 
Representatives when President Bush identified the “axis of evil” as Iran, 
Iraq, and North Korea during his first State of the Union message.1 This 
pronouncement undermined diplomatic inroads made with Iranian 
moderates and established the hard line he would take with North Korea—
humiliating the South Korean president in the process, who was 
summarily sent home from Washington and advised to focus on Seoul’s 
economy. 
To be sure, such a worldview was utilized during the Cold War, when 
much of the map fell into either the American or Soviet orbit. In a bi-polar 
world, with two superpowers dominating geopolitics, that worldview was 
practically forced upon successive presidents. The success of that policy 
was also mixed at best. True, America emerged victorious. However, the 
corrupt and bloody dictatorships Washington had to support in the process 
caused mass suffering and death in all regions of the world. Today, in the 
uni-polar post-cold war era, such a worldview is no longer necessary, and 
can only be supported on the basis of artificial pretext.  
B. Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism 
Unilateralism is a natural outgrowth of such a monochromatic world 
view. The internal logic of the “us versus them” standpoint dictates that 
the perspectives of “them” do not matter and, therefore, deserve neither 
consideration nor accommodation. The “them” category can be small, as 
in the case of the axis of evil, or it can be huge, as in the case of those 
states which support the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. Indeed, the 
fact that America may be the only country in the “us” category is not 
dispositive. 
Unilateral decisions stem from the rock-solid belief in the rightness of 
one’s own cause. Such decisions can be informed ones, but more often 
emerge from closed-minded ill-informed or un-informed moralistic 
judgments. The decision-maker simply cannot fathom that his decision is 
wrong. Moreover, such an attitude fits nicely with a self-created and self-
perceived persona of stoicism and strength. Unfortunately, this is the 
predominate attitude of G.W. Bush. His “go it alone” approach has 
manifested itself in myriad unilateral tendencies, both domestic and 
foreign, since taking office. 
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Domestically, the biggest casualty was his party’s loss of the Senate 
four months into his presidency. Senator Jim Jeffords, a moderate 
Republican from Vermont, specifically cited the cavalier and unilateral, 
non-negotiable stances of the White House and conservative wing of the 
party as driving forces in his decision to leave the G.O.P. and become 
independent but supportive of Democratic control of the Senate. Had Bush 
and his team been more inclusive even within their party, they would have 
continued to control both houses of Congress. 
Internationally, such exclusionary tactics have wrought havoc on 
treaty-making. America is now prone to disengage rather than engage the 
world through international legal mechanisms. The disdain for treaties and 
suspicion of obligations contained in them clearly stems from a preference 
for greater flexibility through political oral agreements and understandings 
rather than legal documents.  
And where pre-existing treaties run counter to the White House’s 
political agenda, they showed no hesitation in terminating them. Almost 
immediately on coming to power, the Bush administration, in support of 
the energy sector that financed it campaiagn, formally withdrew from the 
Kyoto Protocol2 to reduce global warming while simultaneously admitting 
that climate change was occurring. Without consulting any of the other 
parties to the agreement, an enraged outcry arose from Europe that could 
easily have been avoided. President Bush promised to fashion as better 
regime than Kyoto to address the problem. None has been forthcoming. 
Shortly thereafter, the Pentagon determined that it would resurrect the 
Reagan-era dream of a national missile defense system in violation of the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty3 with Russia. Again, the other party to the 
agreement was not consulted, and an unnecessary foreign relations muddle 
was stumbled into. Eventually, the President persuaded Russia not to 
protest America’s invocation of the treaty’s termination clause; and six 
months later, ABM—long the cornerstone of arms limitation treaties, was 
dead. 
The Rome Statute,4 a U.N. effort establishing the International 
Criminal Court, was next on the treaty hit list. President Clinton had 
signed the agreement just before leaving office. The new Court will try 
 
 
 2. Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Chage, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.2, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). 
 3. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 
U.S.T. 3435. 
 4. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998), 
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998). 
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war criminals and perpetrators of genocide around the world instead of on 
an ad hoc basis as with Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Bowing to 
pressure from social conservatives jealous of guarding America’s 
sovereignty, Bush requested the United Nations to withdraw America’s 
signature. He then directed his diplomats to negotiate individual bilateral 
treaties with as many nations as possible providing immunity from the 
Court’s jurisdiction for Americans found within their borders. Twelve 
such bilateral treaties have since been signed. 
The message that this government does not care what the rest of the 
world thinks has been demonstrated time and again. Its guiding philosophy 
is to achieve whatever short-term political gains it can. Because America’s 
interests, defined by the White House, are paramount, consultation is a 
waste of time. The multilateral dynamic in solving global problems is 
irrelevant because multilateralism takes into account the interests and 
perspectives of all states. According to the Bush foreign policy, those 
interests do not matter; therefore, they will not be accommodated if it costs 
anything to do so. 
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State under President Clinton, once 
quipped that in international relations, “America is the indispensable 
nation.”5 She ws rightly and roundly chastised at home and abroad for 
such haughtiness. But under the Bush administration’s foreign policy, 
America is the only nation.  
II. THE WAR ON TERROR 
Both themes outlined above are present in America’s conduct of its 
War on Terror after the September 11th terrorist attacks. An ultimatum, 
known as the new Bush Doctrine, was issued to the world in general and 
to the Taliban in particular which led directly to the invasion of 
Afghanistan and indirectly to an assault on democracy abroad.  
A. Ultimatum & War in Afghanistan 
In his address to a joint session of Congress nine days after attacks on 
the Pentagon and World Trade Center, President Bush put forth his 
ultimatum: 
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Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either 
you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day 
forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism 
will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.6 
There was no outcry against such a clearly unilateral stance. 
Governments around the globe would have backed almost any response to 
the atrocities of September 11th. Indeed, there was complete multilateral 
support for invading Afghanistan, toppling the Taliban, rebuilding that 
country and pursuing al Qaeda operatives—even among Islamic nations. 
Thus, due to the gravity of the situation, a coalition was easily formed 
around the core NATO countries that reacted in support of military action. 
The ultimatum issued to the Taliban regime was no less absolute, and 
provided the basis for invasion of that country upon non-compliance: 
[T]onight, the United States of America makes the following 
demands on the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all the 
leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your land. Release all foreign 
nationals, including American citizens . . . . Protect foreign 
journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country. Close 
immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in 
Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist . . . . Give the United 
States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure 
they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to 
negotiation . . . . The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They 
will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.7 
Because the United States was clearly acting in self-defense after 
suffering a devastating armed attack, its unilateral, monochromatic 
response was accepted and in fact supported by the world community. 
Clearly, the scourge of terrorism drove this process just as other 
intolerable actions like genocide or slave-tracing would have. 
B. Assault on Democracy 
The indirect result of America’s war on terror was an assault on 
democracy. Foreign governments, wrestling with their own separatist or 
terrorist threats, interpreted the Bush Doctrine as giving them carte 
 
 
 6. President’s Message to Joint Session of Congress Responding to the Terrorist Attacks of 
September 11th, PUB. PAPERS (Sept. 24, 2001). 
 7. Id. 
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blanche to use military force and suspend civil liberties to crush those 
movements—free from the repercussion of international condemnation. 
President Bush appeared to encourage such an interpretation when he 
made a supportive appearance with Malaysia’s de facto dictator, Mahathir 
Mohamed, in May 2002. The president praised that regime’s muscular 
pursuit of terrorists while remaining silent on human rights abuses like 
indefinite detention of political prisoners and restrictions on press 
freedom.8 Indeed the president actually interrupted questions from the 
American press to shield Prime Minister Mohamed from a specific query 
about the jailing of his political opponent, Anwar Ibrahim. 
This, together with Attorney General Ashcroft’s multi-tier suppression 
of civil liberties in pursuit of terrorist suspects domestically, constituted a 
green light for other countries to do likewise. Consequently, Russia is 
using a freer hand to quash the Chechen uprising in the south while 
tamping down on freedom of the press, and China has renewed its 
persecution of radical Muslims in the troublesome western province of 
Xinjiang. Singapore has also joined the club of nations that hold terrorist 
suspects indefinitely without charges or trial. 
Perhaps most troubling is the potential for suppression of newfound 
freedoms in Indonesia, a country struggling to foster a culture of 
democracy after decades of dictatorship. In November 2002, President 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, issued a decree granting her special police powers 
to capture and punish terrorist suspects, such as those responsible for the 
bombing of a resort in Bali. In fact, the Bush administration has been 
pressuring Indonesia, as well as Pakistan and the Philippines to toughen up 
their anti-terrorism programs and eradicate such elements from their 
countries—seemingly unconcerned about the negative implications for 
democratic values. 
Regressive executive decisions without legislative input or media 
criticism were the order of the day in many of these nations. But returning 
to such practices without adequate public explanation and opportunity for 
debate only decreases the population’s faith in democracy while increasing 
their cynicism that such freedoms are not permanent, and can be 
suspended without any accountability—judicial or otherwise. Thus, the 
short-term foreign policy gain for the United States of capturing terrorists 
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comes at the expense of the long-term foreign policy aim of instilling 
stable democracies in parts of the world emerging from repressive 
regimes.  
III. THE WAR ON IRAQ—A TURNING POINT? 
In the summer of 2002, President Bush announced his policy of regime 
change in Baghdad, followed by the assertion that he needed no legal 
authority from either Congress or the United Nations to invade that 
country and topple Saddam Hussein.9 He relied on the logic that prior 
resolutions issued a decade ago from both bodies provided all the legal 
authority he needed to proceed. This initial position was completely in 
tune with the White House’s modus operandi to date, and reflected the 
unilateralist influence of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President 
Cheney.10 
However, significant resistance from Secretary Powell within the 
administration together with former Secretary of State Baker, former 
National Security Advisor Scowcroft, and the president’s own father 
stalled this initiative and he was persuaded to seek both congressional and 
U.N. approval before acting. This pivotal decision was a turning point in 
George W. Bush’s thought process. 
It was not only a victory for the multilateral approach, but also a 
mature acknowledgement that involvement of the broader world 
community and the United Nations would legitimize U.S. military action 
against Iraq. Moreover, the decision recognized that coalition and U.N. 
forces could play a critical role in post-conflict nation-building—thereby 
freeing the American military to pursue other objectives in its war on 
terror while simultaneously advancing long-term national interests of 
creating and stabilizing a nascent Arab democracy in the Middle East. 
Consequently, National Security Advisor Rice and Secretary Powell 
prevailed upon the president to alter his definition of regime change. 
Under the new definition, a disarmed Saddam without access to weapons 
of mass destruction would constitute a new regime in Iraq. With this 
change in approach and a commitment to return to the Security Council if 
renewed weapons inspections failed for authorization to use force, 
Ambassador Negroponte was able to secure a 15-0 vote in favor of 
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disarming Iraq that was actually supported by the Arab world. 
Nevertheless, this shift in President Bush’s foreign policy approach 
may prove fleeting. If Saddam breaches the U.N. resolution’s compliance 
provisions and the Security Council finds itself unable to act in response, 
then the only way to move forward against Iraq would be unilaterally. The 
White House has recognized this possibility and provided itself a plausible 
rationale for doing so. 
By arguing that the inherent right of self-defense allowed under the 
U.N. Charter includes the possibility of pre-emptive strikes, the 
administration is hedging its bets that the multilateral approach will 
ultimately work. However, such a return to unilateralism to achieve the 
short-term goal of removing Saddam from power would have potentially 
disastrous long-term effects. 
In the process of resurrecting the long-disused anticipatory self-defense 
doctrine in his 2002 National Security Strategy, the president stripped 
away the old breaking mechanism of proving an “imminent threat” before 
striking so that it could be applied to Iraq—which is not an imminent 
threat. This was replaced with a much lower standard of simply showing 
an “emerging threat”—which Saddam’s pursuit of nuclear weapons clearly 
is. If used, this watered down justification for aggression could be used by 
many countries against their neighbors in many contexts where an 
imminent threat cannot be shown but an emerging threat can be easily 
characterized.11 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Whether abandonment of the unilateral theme underlying President 
Bush’s foreign policy approach during his first two years in office is a 
permanent shift remains to be seen. However, one is cautiously optimistic 
that long-term national interests can now be vigorously pursued through a 
multilateral approach that builds international frameworks for dialogue to 
achieve lasting results. Even so, the monochromatic theme remains firmly 
in place—especially in the case of Iraq. While this may mitigate the 
positive influences of newfound multilateralism to some extent, it is an 
acceptable price to pay for achieving the larger aim of engagement rather 
than disengagement. 
 
 
 11. Michael J. Kelly, Bush’s Pre-Emptive Strategy is a Recipe for Chaos, HOUSTON CHRON., 
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